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Abstract 
Animals, the beautiful creatures of God in the Stoic and especially in Porphyry’s sense, need to be treated as rational. We 
know that the Stoics ask for justice to all rational beings, but I think there is no significant proclamation from their side 
that openly talks in favour of animal’s justice. They claim about the rationality of animals but do not confer any right to 
human beings. The later Neo-Platonist philosopher Porphyry magnificently deciphers this idea in his writing On 
Abstinence from Animal Food. Aristotle’s successor Theophrastus thinks that both animals and humans are made up of 
same tissues and like human, animals also has the same way of perception, reasoning and appetites. 
My next effort would be to decipher how Porphyry illustrates Theophrastus’ perspective not in the way (the technical 
theory of justice) the Stoics argued. Porphyry’s stance seems more humanistic that looks for the pertinent reasons for 
treating animal rights from the contention of justice that Aristotle in his early writings defied since the animals can deal 
with reasons. The paper highlights on how much we could justificatorily demand the empathetic concern for animals 
from the outlook of the mentioned Greek thinkers and the modern animal rights thinkers as quasi-right of animals, even 
if my own position undertakes the empathetic ground for animals as an undeserving humanitarian way. 
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Introduction 
The world is as much as our; in the same way for the 
animals or non-humans. Non-humans are a bigger part of 
the world who with us in their regions. They are 
doubtlessly intelligent, sensitive, emotional and conscious 
animals. Few decades back, humans basically undermine 
animals by accusing that animals have no conception 
regarding responsibility, reason and justice, so we should 
not be concerned about the right of animals. We can be 
rationally sympathetic or harmful to animals. The lives of 
animals are just bow out for the sake of human’s needs 
and feeds. Even in The Vedas, the oldest sacred religious 
book of the Hindus, animals are viewed as objects that 
humans can sacrifice to Gods for fulfilling his/her 
material and intellectual desires like long life, wealth, and 
salvation. However the Post-Vedic literatures put 
emphasis on a different view by pondering animals as a 
part of our life and world. I would not like to stress on 
these challenging areas as my focus is mainly intense on 
the Greek Philosophy and its consequences in the modern 
era.  
 
For Whom We Should be Concerned 
An old debate that always welcomes troubled 
situations in philosophical analysis is nothing but the 
moral question of rights to animals or in short, how can 
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individual ought to treat the animals accordingly. Ancient 
Greek philosophy like other philosophical schools, seeks a 
comprehend moral agency. Humans are doubtlessly moral 
agents who have reason, responsibility and the power of 
judgment. But what will be for our fellow non-human 
animals? Do animals hold any moral agency? If yes, Shall 
we have moral concern for non-human animals?  
 
Asking about one’s own right obviously sounds a type 
of capability to be rational, moral and responsible agency. 
Animals do not possess these mentioned humanitarian 
criterions; therefore like other more affluent civilizations 
in the ancient periods of Greek (from the pre-Socrates to 
Plato’s periods) and their philosophical expeditions never 
bestow any kind of concentration on animal rights. I 
include here Plato on the basis of his loath approach 
against animals’ rights and welfare, whereas the pre-
Socratic thinker Pythagoras (570-495 BCE) had a 
humanistic compassion about the animals and he is 
probably the first thinker of the ancient Greek philosophy 
who wonderfully claims for the safety of non-humans 
animals and puts it in a way ‘As long as man continues to 
be the ruthless destroyer of lower living beings he will 
never know health or peace. For as long as men massacre 
animals, they will kill each other. Indeed, he who sows the 
seed of murder and pain cannot reap joy and love.’ 
Because Pythagoras believes that the souls of animals and 
humans are not secluded in nature as both the souls 
(animals and humans) come from the one origin whom 
we called God. The problem elevates when both the Stoics 
and the Aristotelian fail to acknowledge the conceptions 
of the reasonability and rationality of animals. The Stoic 
schools provoke justice of all rational beings (the rational 
beings must have some fellow feelings) but refrained 
from admitting animal rights as they are neither 
apprehending on rationality nor on the responsibility. In 
this point Plato, who believes animals as a reincarnation 
of human souls further denies the conceptions of reason 
and rationality from the levels of animals. Plato thinks 
that animals have intellect, but it is not guided by reason1 
[1]. However, in Timaeus2, Plato also claims positively 
about the belief procedures of animals that are not 
available in any plant. Plato seems never talked about the 
rights of animals [2].  
 
The process of eliminating rationality cum 
responsibility from animals centres round the Aristotle’s 
stance to look back to the same challenge whether 
animals have any reason and belief. Unlike his mentor 
Plato, Aristotle believes in any kind of idealism and lay off 
                                                             
1Plato, Laws, 1921. 961D or 963E. 
2Plato, Timaeus, 2008. 77A-C. 
the conception of provoking on animals’ beliefs. Aristotle 
strongly opposes any type of reason, reasoning, beliefs, 
thoughts and intellect (nous) in animals mind. As reason 
is being deficient in animals, so there is no question about 
the true and false beliefs of animals. Though there may be 
some animals whom we can teach as they have the 
capabilities to receive prhonesis extravagances and 
experience. But they never comprehend about the logical 
and scientific indulgences.  
Aristotle argues: 
Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems 
to be shared even by the horse, the ox, and every animals. 
There remains, then, an active life of the element that has 
reason; of this, one part has it in the sense of being 
obedient to reason, the other in the sense of possessing 
reason and exercising thought3 [3].  
 
The first reasonable objection is raised by the Stoics 
and furthermore by Aristotle together against the 
perceptual content of animals. The Stoics dexterously 
confine the understanding of perceptual content in the 
case of humans as their perceptual appearances have 
some propositional contents. The Stoics put emphasis on 
the propositional appearances in the animals’ sense that 
either can be verbalised or conceptualised. Animals may 
have the ability to follow some signs and non-verbal 
commands, but they are inept to grasp any kind of verbal 
conditional statements. Long clarifies: 
 
Stoics say that man differs from the irrational animals 
not in uttered discourse (logos), for crows, parrots and 
jays utter articulate sounds. Nor does he differ from the 
other creatures in virtue of impressions created by 
inference and combination. This amounts to man’s 
possessing an idea of ‘connexion’ and he grasps the 
concept of signal because of this4 [4]. 
 
The Stoics’ denial of animals’ reason blends with the 
instruction basing on some sort of impulses. Animals 
seldom insist on the commands or the instructions of 
human beings, because of their sensation and life that 
seem not to be guided by reasons and responsibilities. For 
the Stoics, our believes are engaged always with assents. 
Animals don’t have the power of assent as they never 
have the capability to construct belief statements. There 
are a few who hesitate to admit the experience-based 
learning of animals, whereas some of the Stoics admit this 
process. Aristotle takes a steeper appeal when he says 
animals may have the perceptual appearance but that 
does not hold any kind of belief. Belief is a procedure 
                                                             
3Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 2009. 1.7, 1098a, 11.    
4 Long A A, 1986, 125. 
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interlinked to the persuaded and processing reasons; 
whereas, the neo-Platonists hint towards the rationality. 
We find an embryonic passage (de Anima) in Aristotle’s 
writing that strongly refuses animals possession of belief 
and reason. Aristotle argues,  
 
It remains then to see if [appearance (phantasia)] is 
belief (doxa), for belief comes both true and false. But 
belief involves conviction (pistis), since in believing one 
cannot fail to be convinced (pisteuein) by what one 
believes, whereas conviction is found in no beasts 
(theria), appearance in many. Furthermore, all belief 
involves conviction, conviction involves having been 
persuaded (pepeisthai) and persuasion (peitho) involves 
reason (logos). Yet whereas appearance is found in some 
beasts, reason is not5 [5]. 
 
Now, one can enquire whether we can question the 
voluntary movement of animals. In his well-known book 
On The Soul, Aristotle talks about the appearance cum 
thoughts of the animals together. But for Aristotle, 
animals’ appearances have no conceptualised issue, and 
their thought refers to the post-perceptual appearances 
that are unrelated to the belief system. Aristotle who 
believes in the natural hierarchy of living beings aims to 
reject the preference of the moral quality in animals. The 
animals are less reasoning being who only exist for the 
sake of human beings. The intelligence that animals hold 
is a kind of simple intelligence guided by emotions which 
has no relation to the human intelligence nourished by 
the technical knowledge (tekhne), reason and 
understanding (sunesis) and so on. In his book On the Soul, 
Aristotle stresses on the question of proposition and links 
it to perception. Humans have the perceptual or post-
perceptual perception (like dream, memory, etc) cum 
appearances, whereas animals (not all) perceptual 
appearance cannot able to capture post-perceptual 
appearances and side by side the propositional structure 
of beliefs. The animal can see something and feel the 
conceptions of pleasant or unpleasant, but all these are 
discarded by any kind of privileged reason. The argument 
that Aristotle values here is nothing but the perceptual 
apparatus of animals which have been constructed 
without any belief. Denial of animals’ beliefs sustains from 
a few ground levels queries like: 
a) No animal can set aside the perceived colour red from 
the propositional belief like ‘This is red and it 
disengages from yellow’.  
b) Mere perceptual appearance cannot seize the position 
of beliefs. Both human and animals perceive sun and 
                                                             
5I quoted the line from Richard Sorabji’s work Animals Mind and Humans 
Morals, 1993. 37. 
moon as small, but in reality they are not like our 
perceptual appearance. We can be aware of the truth, 
but animals cannot know the fact.  
c)  Animals do not have any belief or degree of beliefs as 
they cannot convince nor unconvinced others. This is a 
kind of rhetorical criticism against the belief of animals. 
d) The conception of self-persuasion would have 
definitely lacked in animals minds. Richard Sorabji 
writes:  
 
The denial that what animals’ have is beliefs are not a 
mere piece of verbal legislation. In the absence of 
conviction and self-persuasion, Aristotle would think we 
were wrong to describe their state as belief6.  
 
Here the primordial question is for whom we need to 
be concerned. Can we concern and be responsible for the 
non-rational, reasonless, self-persuasion less, belief-less 
animals who are guided only by perception, voluntary act 
and emotion? An important point that asks for more 
clarification is nothing but the conception of the voluntary 
acts of animals. Aristotle admits the conception although 
he strongly believes that the voluntary act links to the 
realm of liability. The origin of the voluntary actions has 
some internal based roots that in the case of animal are 
not directed by responsibility and reason. The 
requirement for any voluntary action is the elements of 
responsibility, reason and knowledge (it may be true or 
false), but animals voluntary actions envisage none of the 
mentioned elements. Animals voluntary acts as a non-
rational and non-reason based capacities neither goes 
beyond reverse outcomes nor to deliberate choices on 
which Aristotle stressed. Sorabji clarifies Aristotle’s 
position to say: 
 
Non-rational capacities are incapable of opposite 
outcomes, Aristotle says, whereas rational capacities such 
as the doctor’s ability to heal can be used in opposite 
ways, either to restore to withhold health. This might 
have encouraged Aristotle to conclude that only those 
actions are up to us which are exercises of a rational 
capacity like medicine, because only those capacities are 
capacities for opposite outcomes...Deliberate choice 
comes in at two points, both in the selection of policies to 
secure goals and in the selection of goals as entering into 
the ideal life. The deliberate choice of human is carefully 
distinguished from the merely voluntary acts of animals7.  
 
Animals nonetheless even concern about values. They 
are totally ignorant about the processing of right and 
                                                             
6ibid., 37 
7ibid., 109. 
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wrong or what we may call ‘conscience’. Since the animals 
voluntary actions are beyond any deliberate choice or 
reason based outcomes, so here the question of 
responsibility from human’s stance is a prerequisite.  
 
Sense of Justice Versus Justice/Rights 
Proclaim 
On the basis of ‘sense of justice’ the concept of animal 
rights in regard to deserving justice becomes episodic in 
the Stoics and Aristotle’s thoughts as animals don’t have 
any sense of justice since they are the speechless non-
rational creatures who are afar from any rational choice 
stirred by reasons. This outline goes towards a striking 
consequence, whether animals at all have any right or the 
sense of justice in general. The Stoics believe in the 
natural law and instigate on the belief that there is a 
single and eternal natural law harmonized in nature and 
Cicero8, a leading Stoic emphasised this opinion clearly 
without giving any attention to animal rights [6]. Aristotle 
who holds Empedocles’ law as natural clarifies that 
Empedocles takes a stand against animals killing in his 
universal law 9  (nomimon). Aristotle allows ‘animals’ 
killing’10 as a right for the purpose of human’s ravenous to 
be fed [7,8]. So the Greek philosophers have the idea of 
right, but they give less importance to animals’ right as 
animals have no sense of justice or demand for justice at 
all. They endorse the policy that humans can kill animals 
for their lives, survival and starvation. The domination 
power or the autocracy of men over the world is god 
gifted as men are the images of god. 
 
But the proclamation of animal rights in Neo-Platonist 
Stoic thinker Porphyry’s (A.D. 234–to about 305) sense 
was stimulated by Theophrastus, the successor of 
Aristotle who considers that animals have the same 
tissues like humans and their appetites, and reasoning are 
quite similar to human beings. Stoics’ theory of justice 
impounds themselves just in the mere boundary of 
human species whereas Theophrastus position gives 
more concern about the ‘justice and right of animals’11 as 
he believes that animals hold rationality and reason 
concurrently [9]. Porphyry, the legendary opponent of 
                                                             
8Cicero, On the Republic, 1928. 3.33. 
9Aristotle writes, ‘And so Empedocles, when he bids us kill no living 
creature, says that doing this is not just for some people while unjust for 
others’, Aristotle, Rhetoric, 2010. 58.  
10Aristotle says, ‘... Just as we would not to hunt mankind, whether for 
food and sacrifice, but only the animals which may be hunted for food or 
sacrifice, this is to say, such wild animals are eatable.’, see Aristotle, 
Politics,1999.156.   
11Theophrastus of Eresus, 1992. 407-37.  
animals killing in his great treatise On Abstinence from 
Animal Food was highly motivated by Theophrastus’ 
outlook by becoming a campaigner vegetarian on both 
devout and moral levels. Porphyry believes in rationality 
and sentiment of animals and consequently cedes to 
accept his mentor Aristotle’s standpoint against reason 
and rationality based animated animals. Porphyry says: 
 
But with respect to other animals who do not at all act 
unjustly, and are not naturally impelled to injure us, it is 
certainly unjust to destroy and murder them, no 
otherwise than it would be to slay men who are not 
iniquitous. And this seems to evince that the justice 
between us and other animals does not arise from some 
of them being naturally noxious and malefic, but others 
not, as is also the case with respect to men12 [10]. 
 
Porphyry plunges over an anti-Christian view to 
prevent animal killing. He castigates the concept of 
spiritual sacrifice of animals (see, 2.61) and says: 
 
To the gods the best first offering (aparkhê) is a pure 
intellect and an untroubled soul.  
 
This philanthropic attitude of Porphyry towards 
animals hinges not only on the abstinence of animals 
killing simply because of making pleasure and gluttony, 
but also concerns the natural laws that persist the natural 
equilibrium between animals and humans. Predecessor 
Epicurean model propose the killing of animals as 
humans cannot strike up a peaceful treaty with the 
animals, and so the only alteration is just to kill them for 
the sake of human beings. Even the process of killing 
animals for human’s security and gluttony is directed by 
the first law makers of our society who were more 
concerned about the advantage of human lives rather 
than animals. Porphyry discards this type of opinion and 
infers it as a ‘most profound stupidity’ of humanity. 
Porphyry’s argument sounds more appealing, when he 
urges: 
 
It is not necessary; however, that these institutes [of laws] 
should be preserved by us, because we do not dwell in the 
same place as those did by whom they were made13. 
 
However, in support of veganism, Porphyry illustrates 
that since the beginning of our primitive age to till now 
we remain engrossed thinking about what would be the 
garments of our bodies, but we never thought what would 
be the best garment for our mind. If flesh is the garment 
                                                             
12Porphyry, Selected Works of Porphyry, 1823. 60. 
13ibid., 10. 
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of body then thinking is the best garment of mind. But the 
problem is that the garment of the mind becomes 
malicious because of the false ideas that only impound us 
with greed and tyranny that eliminate us from the 
intertwined parts of animals and the environment. This is 
really an intellectual crisis of human minds. Successful 
intellectuals (must be a vegan) are always intended to 
clean themselves from the inward side. The proper love of 
true beings ensue in respect to abstaining sensible 
passions of mind from the pleasure of taking animals 
fleshes or adopting the brutal ways of killing animals etc. 
Porphyry suggests human beings to return to their native 
self where our peaceful mind and body was habituated in 
taking some vegan products instead of animals’ fleshes. 
Besides, basing on reason (not guided by sensible 
passions) human beings absorb themselves to the 
intellectual quests for the goodness of all. Here Porphyry 
seems more close to Pythagoras, who once taught us that 
during the golden-age, people ‘did not defile their lips 
with blood’. Even for the case of sacrificing to gods, 
Pythagoras and his followers never used any kind of 
animal products; rather they worshiped with wooden 
products. According to Plato: 
 
...Pythagoras taught 'a way of life,' and we can now see 
what the purpose of that life was. It was to live in 
accordance with what is highest in us, remembering 
always its divine origin14 [11]. 
 
Relooking the Ideology in Modern Sense 
The ideology of animal rights has two different routes- 
empathy and deontology. Some philosophers think that 
the non-human animals have moral standing, so we need 
to be morally apprehensive about their good and welfare. 
And this is called a moral duty of humanity to the non-
human animals from our human-side. Other philanthropic 
philosophers stress their empathies and loves to animals 
by believing that those animals are the best friend of 
human or a kind of our relatives with whom we have a kin 
relationship, also believe in the moral rights of animals as 
the Stoics hold (especially Porphyry) . Here my attempt is 
to justify that animal rights do not rely on any human 
kindness or empathy, but it is really a right that can speak 
for itself. In the beginning of the paper, I bore in mind that 
the world is as much as our, in the same status it is also 
for the non-human animals who have thought, life, 
intelligence, emotion and rationality like humans. 
Although the present scenario of the world 
(environmental misbalance) does not allow us to explore 
whether animals at all can have right etc., yet our concern 
                                                             
14Robinson, An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy, 1968.  
should be how we could retrieve animals’ right to them in 
a sophisticated manner. Tom Regan sounds more 
appealing, when he says: 
 
...No one has a right to be protected against being harmed 
if protection in question involves violating the right of 
others...15 [12]. 
 
Here the existing question is how could the progress of 
medical science be possible without using the animals 
simply as their means for experiment in order to invent 
medicines for relieving human lives from different 
terrible ailments? This is truly a big challenge for our 
society to advocate their promise pertaining to the claim 
of not killing animals. Human moral understanding that 
constructs the ideas of justice, moral conscience etc., 
actually comes from their instinctive non-derivative 
cognition that non-human animals are unable to attain 
biologically. Rationality or the different methods of 
communication for animals are not a right issue here, 
actually the enigma of cognitive disability regarding 
moral conscience and the self-legislation lead the animals 
to be morally perilous. Hence, one can argue in favour of 
the Plato-Aristotelian trend that the conception of right 
bestrews the people who have moral conscience or who 
have the possibilities to ensure the subject of morality in a 
refined way. Animals don’t have any moral state of mind, 
so they could never be the autonomy of the subject 
position of any moral claim. Besides, they never act 
morally. We need to be compassionate for their lives and 
we must have some earnest obligations for preserving 
their lives to sustain the equilibrium of nature. However 
we have to fairly construct a disparity between the terms 
like obligation and right.  
 
One very intriguing observation that is later raised by 
Pollan in support of predation sounds elegant in this 
context as he urges, ‘predation is not a matter of morality 
or politics’16 [13]. Here Pollan argues that the demand of 
animal liberalists against predation seems a kind of 
‘profound ignorance’ on the working procedures of 
natural laws that have its own method. Imposing moral 
rights to animals is a kind of worst anthropomorphism. 
We should be careful and thankful to the fellow animals, 
but that does not mitigate the conclusion in favour of the 
moral rights of the non-conscience animals. All of us are 
indubitably governed by the laws of nature and these are 
somehow deserving that nature will avert us to provide 
full moral rights to animals. This approach can be a good 
                                                             
15Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 1983. 346-347. 
16Pollan, Omnivore’s Dilemma, 2006. 322. 
         Philosophy & Epistemology International Journal 
 
Chakraborty S. Animal Rights -‘One-of-Us-ness’: From the Greek Philosophy 
towards a Modern Stance. Philos Epistemol Int J 2018, 1(2): 000107. 
             Copyright© Chakraborty S. 
 
6 
challenge to Peter Singer’s model of the principle of equal 
consideration17 of interests to animals [14].  
 
Moreover, Peter Singer’s interesting thesis (gustatory 
satisfaction 18  against animals’ killing) seems quite 
unfeasible as food habits and expediency gustatory are 
not the precise justificatory ground, whereas Regan is 
more forceful when he focuses on the problem from a 
holistic utilitarian way [15]. Killing animals for preserving 
or retailing their meats are not only rest on the gustatory 
riddles but it is also a huge globalized commerce. This 
would be an exigent fact to expose how many people are 
intentionally and non-intentionally associated with this 
business. We cannot criticize only the butchers or the 
consumers for their animals killing. There may be some 
vegan scientists who invented a medicine to preserve 
meats for a long or meat packaging designers, or 
packaged meat shippers who perhaps unwillingly are 
compelled to being a part of their respective businesses 
because of their employment policies19 [16].  
 
If we intend to bypass the debate and concentrate on 
the core area of moral rights of animals, then undoubtedly 
the pertinent point is what sorts of criterion an animal 
needs to accomplish for becoming a moral agent or moral 
patient. Regan’s model edifices so many criterions like 
perception, belief, memory, desire, sense of future, 
psychological identities, emotion, pain, pleasure etc., 
which collectively makes an animal as a subject-of-a-life20. 
But the disagreement will interweave only if Regan 
strongly claims that the criterions should be solely 
followed by mammals rather than reptiles, fishes or birds 
etc. My point is that Wittgenstein’s model of family 
resemblance can be a right way that always suggests us a 
weaker view to share most of the common features (not 
anyway all) as animals may have the criteria of 
psychological identities, but incapable to construct any 
future sense.  
 
                                                             
17Singer says, “The essence of the Principle of Equal Consideration of 
Interests is that we give equal weight in our moral deliberations to the 
like interests of all those affected by our actions”, Singer, Practical Ethics, 
1993. 21.  
18Singer writes, “Since, as I have said, none of these practices (of raising 
animals intensively) caters for anything more than our pleasures of 
taste, our practice of rearing and killing other animals in order to eat 
them is a clear instance of the sacrifice of the most important interests of 
other beings in order to satisfy trivial interests of our own ... we must 
stop this practice, and each of us has a moral obligation to cease 
supporting this practice.”, Singer, ‘All animals are equal’, 1989. 155.  
19Rowlands, Animal Rights, Moral Theory and Practice, 2009. 54-56. 
20Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 1983. 243 
Moral rights of animals sound as a valid claim, but 
there is no moral simplicitor that can detect the criterion 
to be a moral agent. Moral patients are another aspect, 
where we find some particular animals or non-beings 
who do not have most of the features to becoming an 
animal as depicted by Regan, although they may still have 
lives like reptiles, fishes etc. In addition, acceding Regan 
to an extent, all subject-of-a-life sufficiently (not 
necessarily) have inherent values. The most significant 
characteristic of inherent value concise its boundary 
within the frame line of incommensurability of intrinsic 
value of animals. Mark Rowlands clarifies: 
 
If we suppose that subjects-of-a- life do possess 
inherent value, then we can explain our considered beliefs 
about the importance of justice and about what just 
treatment amounts to. So, the postulation of inherent 
value, at least on Regan’s view, is an explanation of our 
considered moral beliefs – or as Rawls would put it, our 
reflective intuitions – concerning justice. And given the 
manifest, or at least arguable, failure of other theories to 
account for these beliefs or intuitions, we have good 
reason for supposing that the postulation of inherent 
value is the best explanation of these beliefs. Thus, 
inherent value is a theoretical postulate, justified, on 
Regan’s view, as an inference to the best explanation 21.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
A prima facie view that humanity aims to maintain is 
not to harm the subject-of-a-life, this principle has a 
remarkable relation to the revered principle that focuses 
on the valid claim of respect and to keep safe others lives.  
 
The question of moral right of animals is emerged 
when according to Regan’s look the two statues like a 
valid claim-against and a valid claim-to can work together. 
Moral right bestows on a certain commodity which have a 
valid claim to all things painstaking to that commodity. 
Besides, a valid claim in defense of all things is considered 
against the particular policy work when individuals 
intend to provide the commodity and respect to the other 
animals. So an individual who possesses inherent value 
must have the moral right to deserve moral treatment 
from the society and others. But this policy goes towards 
an absurdity as it will contravene the food circle of the 
environment. If a cat chases a rat, then our duty would be 
to prevent the cat from marauding on rat for the sake of 
saving the life of the rat. In this case, we are doing 
injustice with the rat as our quest will coerce the cat to 
pass through starvation and this course of action leads the 
                                                             
21Rowlands, Animal Rights, Moral Theory and Practice, 2009. 65. 
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particular cat to painful death. We nevertheless 
contravene the natural cum biological right of animals 
and their food habits. But if it confronts with human lives, 
then the picture becomes totally change. In normal cases 
when a tiger aims to prey a man for satisfying his hunger, 
it cannot be regarded as natural cum biological food habit 
of an animal. Here saving the life of a man is more 
significant than the dying of the tiger. This may be 
because a common human life is more paradigmatic than 
the life of any other animal. Humans have superior moral 
values that are highly unavailable in animal lives. These 
sorts of anti-speciesist arguments encircle in the domain 
of human existence and human facilities. It sounds true 
that our intended tests to separate men from animals 
always regain prolific, but the criterions that make the 
demarcation sometimes also may lack in human beings. 
These entire criterions like non-rationality, immorality, 
unconsciousness, non-language user etc may not be 
invoked even in the case of child, coma patient, etc 
although they are human being and have the potentiality 
to be human.  
 
Human beings intend to make animals life easier and 
cheerful especially for those who are under controlled by 
us and who have some domestic senses. Our empathetic 
mind sometime treats them as our friend, guest or holy 
creatures who have direct lineage with deities. A type of 
anthropomorphism that is nourished by empathy escorts 
us to think and confer animals about their rights from a 
sympathetic outlook. We may consider it as a goodness of 
human nature. I undermine the anti-speciesist approach 
from this level. Animals’ rights are beyond of any 
compassion or empathetic outlook of human beings. The 
right of animals is a kind of right they can fully claim 
without being anthropomorphic. It may be true that 
animals don’t have the sense of justice, but being a living 
creature, the proclamation of justice to be alive is a 
natural right for them. Right cannot be considered as 
something that depends on others compassion and 
charity. Animal rights, I assume from the level of 
anthropomorphism makes it more reliable to quasi-right, 
i.e., a legal concept, in which some rights similar to those 
rights (in anthropomorphic sense) may be ensued by a 
group who perform an act which promotes societal 
benefits altogether. For the sake of promoting mankind 
and their secure existence, if we consider that we should 
care for the lives of animals and so and so by safeguarding 
brutal animals killing or by being more compassionate 
about saving animals lives, then the venture of right of 
animals (animals should have right policy) and animal 
welfare protection rules look contemptuous. Here the 
animal welfare protection indirectly hints at saving 
human existence. Animals are not the property of human 
being, about whom we can enforce laws to preserve them 
securely. Animals are the property of nature as humans 
are and their rights are enshrined by the natural laws, not 
in any way by human compassion or in a word animal 
rights are beyond of any human compassion. Human must 
not place themselves as the master of the world or as 
collective agents having control over the non-human 
groups. Man’s own position in this world still remains 
insecure and they are still in the hands of nature’s laws. 
The conception of autonomy and the idea of empathy to 
animal rights are a pipe dream. Besides, the conception of 
rights asks that it should not be delimited by other’s 
ideals and generosity. I consider Korsgaard’s opinion 
more appealing, when she claims: 
 
They live according to their natures, not according to 
their values or their free choices or their personal 
conceptions of what is good. Nor is there much to be said 
for granting them to the nearest analogy to that kind of 
liberty - freedom of action in the simplest sense, allowing 
them to go where they please and do what they want22 
[17].  
 
One cannot sue that humans must have right to live 
and work as these are not any provisional rights of human 
beings; similarly, we should endue the animals a suitable 
situation for enjoying their own rights as our fellow 
creatures. Rights of animals are a kind of collective agency 
rights that pertain to all non-human animals in general 
instead of the domestic animals who enjoy more rights 
since they are appealing to humans; whereas the wilds 
seem more ferocious to humans, so we disrupt their 
rights. Rights are in general neutral and besides, 
Darwinian evolution theory emphasizes that animals are 
not in any way human properties or the subject of 
human’s will, because animals strive for their own 
existence from the beginning of the world. It is true that 
we have no right to claim against animals as they are not 
moral conscience beings, in the same manner animals also 
have no right to claim against humans or to fellow 
animals as they (animals) do not have the freedom to 
think morally. But the point is that not to think morally 
does not express the consequence that the subject as 
living being is beyond any moral concern. Moral laws are 
relational and these are centre around the periphery of 
human beings. Therefore, by turning back to human’s 
concern for moral laws edify the connection between 
humans and the specific animals. Preservation of human’s 
autonomy is a good view that has been well supported by 
Darwinian model too, but one obsession we should follow 
                                                             
22Korsgaard, “Two Claims of Animals and the Needs of Strangers: Two 
Cases of Imperfect Rights” 7. 
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that ‘In fact, we ourselves make claims of individual 
claims of right, a commitment to dealing fairly with our 
fellow inhabitants23, a representation that tinges more 
close to Mrs. Thatcher’s philanthropic adage ‘one-of-us-
ness’!  
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